Confusion in the bench on citizenship issue

Most countries use a combination of two principles to determine whether a person is a citizen by operation of law, that is as a birthright or automatically. These principles are 

– Jus Soli – means “right of the soil” in Latin. Being born in that country gives the person the automatic right to be a citizen of the country. 

– Jus Sanguinis – the right of lineage. This requires one to have parents who are citizens of that country to qualify for citizenship of that country.

Different countries give differing weightages to these two principles. In the US for example, Jus Soli has far greater weightage than in Malaysia. If a refugee mother, delivers in the US, that confers the right to citizenship to that child. Trump and his supporters are trying to change the laws to abolish this birth right.

Malaysia requires satisfying both principles, with more weightage on the principle of lineage, Jus Sanguinis. Articles 14 and 15 of the Federal Constitution specify the various circumstances that convey the right to Malaysian citizenship “by operation of law”. Other constitutional provisions such as Articles 15(A), 16 and 19 describes circumstances where the Government (Minister of Home Affairs) has the discretionary power to award citizenship. 

Citizenship was a big deal in the late 1950s, because at Independence, the number of non-Malays residing in Malaya was about equal to the number of Malays. Some Malay leaders feared that the more economically well-off and educated non-Malay population would progress faster than the Malays, and render the Malays second class citizens in their own motherland. This wasn’t an unreasonable or irrational fear. Just consider the situation of the Incas in Latin America, the Blacks in South Africa and the Maori in New Zealand.

As a result, the circumstances that would confer citizenship were specified in great detail and included in the Federal Constitution as Schedule Two. This has three parts. Part One of the Second Schedule is titled “Citizenship by Operation of Law of Persons Born Before Malaysia Day”. Part Two of the Second Schedule is titled “Citizenship by Operation of Law of Persons Born on or after Malaysia Day”. And Part Three (the longest) is titled “Supplementary Provisions Relating to Citizenship”. Articles 14 through 19 of the Federal Constitution have to be read in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the Second Schedule to determine a particular person’s right to Malaysian citizenship.     

One such person is Mr V who was born in Tanjung Malim, Perak in 1987. He possesses a Birth Certificate which attests to the date and place of birth as well as to his mother’s name. His mother, Mdm B, had no documents at the time of V’s birth. She was the last child of an immigrant Indian family. Her eldest sibling was born in India and brought to Malaysia as a child. Her other siblings were all born in Malaysia and obtained Malaysian citizenship – probably under provisions of Article 16 of the Federal Constitution. Mdm B’s link to this set of siblings has been proven by a DNA test that established that Mdm P, the last surviving sibling, shares the same parents with Mdm B. Based on this, and the testimony of Mdm P and other family members, we managed to register the birth of Mdm B – she was born in 1952, in Kuala Lumpur. 

Mr V’s father had not been with the family for the past 25 years, and going by provision 17 of Part Three of the Second Schedule, would have no bearing on V’s application for citizenship, since V’s parents never registered their marriage. Thus, V’s father’s Malaysian citizenship could not be used as grounds for V’s citizenship application. 

We applied to the Registration Department in Meru, Ipoh arguing that Section 1(e) of Part Two of the Second Schedule read together with Article 14 (1)(b) of the Federal Constitution confers citizenship by operation of law. Since this is at the crux of the matter, we need to know the actual wording of the relevant sections.

    Article 14(1): The following persons are citizens by operation of law

    Article 14(1)(b): Every person born on or after Malaysia day and having any of the qualifications  

       specified in Part Two of the Second Schedule

    Section 1 of Part Two of the Second Schedule: the following persons born on or after Malaysia day are

       citizens by operation of law

    Section 1(e) of Part Two of the Second Schedule : every person born within the Federation who is not

       born a citizen of any country otherwise than by virtue of this paragraph.

Let’s pause here a little to ask – how would a person born within the Federation be born a citizen of another country? Clearly, by the principle of Jus Sanguinis. He/She would need to have parents who are citizens of that other country. That blood lineage would give the right to citizenship in that other country. 

Based on the above, it seemed crystal clear to us that since V

 – was born in Tanjung Malim, Perak (in the Federation)

– born on 24/2/1987 (after Malaysia Day)

– has a mother who was a not a citizen of any other country at the time of his birth (or at any point in her life). (This third point establishes that V at birth had no valid claim to citizenship in any other country.), he satisfies all the requirements under 1(e) and should be conferred citizenship by operation of law.

As explained above, his father’s name was not recorded in V’s birth certificate, and in any case, Section 17 of Part III of the Second Schedule exclude his father playing any role in the determination of V’s citizenship. 

We were therefore disappointed when the National Registration Department rejected our application for citizenship for V. But not too surprised, for citizenship rights has always been somewhat a contentious issue in this country, and there are some layers of the bureaucracy that still seem to be driven by the anxieties mentioned above. But we believed that the Courts would set things right. Boy, we were in for an unpleasant surprise!

Mr Annou Xavier of Azri, Lee Swee Seng & Co graciously agreed to represent Mr V in Court pro-bono. Our Judicial Review application was filed in the Damansara High Court in April 2024. We asked for a Cetiori squashing the Registration Departments rejection of V’s application for citizenship, and a Mandamus that he should be awarded Malaysian citizenship. Unfortunately, the learned judge turned down our application. In his written judgement he starts out well, noting, “Being a fundamental right, it has been held that citizenship rights have to be construed as widely as possible without changing or warping the base meaning, while the provisions that limit those rights must be construed as narrowly as possible” (para 11 of Grounds of Judgement – GOJ)

Then, in para 17 of his GOJ, the learned judge refers to three Appeal Court decisions which “held that the concept of jus soli and jus sanguinis are embedded in Section 1(e), and the burden of proof lies on the applicant to fulfil both requirements. Needless to say, I am bound by these decisions.” 

This observation is true. For, if V’s mother had been a citizen of another country for example India, then V, at birth would have had a path to citizenship to that country. In other words, the principle of jus sanguinis would have offered the route to citizenship in another country, and thus negate his right to citizenship in Malaysia under 1(e). The absence of any route to citizenship in another country on the basis of his mother’s citizenship (principle of Jus Sanguinis), is precisely the reason why V qualifies for citizenship under 1(e). 

But the learned Judge then argued that V did not satisfy the Jus Sanguinis principle for Malaysian citizenship. In para 28 of his GOJ, the learned Judge states “it would appear that the appellant would need to satisfy both the requirements of jus soli and jus sanguinis in order to fulfil the requirements of Art 14(1)(b) and section 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule.” Here, the Judge erred seriously. The Jus Sanguinis principle required in Section 1(a) of Part Two of the Second Schedule is proof that the applicant has lineage that links him to Malaysia – ie one of his parents must be Malaysian. In Section 1(e) however, the Jus Sanguinis principle is used in a completely different way – to establish that the applicant does not have parents who are citizens of another country. The same principle of blood lineage, but linking the applicant to another country. 1(e) does not require the applicant to show lineage to Malaysia. But somehow, the learned Judge got it wrong. He mixed up the requirement enunciated in 1(a) with the requirement necessary to satisfy 1(e).

But, although the Judge himself correctly noted, each of the 5 clauses under Section 1 of Part Two, stand on their own, he ended up trying to merge the requirements contained in Section 1(a) into our application based on Section 1(e). This led to his conclusion in para 26 of the GOJ where he says “for the purpose of citizenship under Article 14(1)(b) read with Section 1 (e), the applicant failed to show that his mother is a citizen.”  Then, one needs to ask, why not just apply under Section 1(a). There is then no need for a Section 1(e) in Part II of the Second Schedule. This is, really, further evidence that the learned Judge got it wrong – if a High Court judgement renders a portion of the Federal Constitution redundant, then there must be something wrong with that judgement itself!

This is why we referred the matter to the Appeal Court. However, we were again disappointed. The Court of Appeal Judges also failed to appreciate that the principle of Jus Sanguinis has to be applied differently in the evaluation of an application under 1(e) of Part II of the Second Schedule, and not in the manner it would be applied in an application under 1(a) of Part II, Second Schedule. In 1(a), the applicant has to show a blood lineage to Malaysian citizenship – his mother would have to be a citizen of Malaysia for him to qualify (given that his parent’s marriage wasn’t registered, Section 17 of Part III of the Second Schedule excludes his father from this consideration.) 

However, for an application under 1(e), the applicant has to prove that he has no blood lineage that grants him citizenship to any other country. In other words, he has to present evidence that his birth mother did not hold citizenship of any country. And to establish this he has provided 

  • A birth certificate that states that his mother, Mdm B, was born in Kuala Lumpur in December 1952. 
  • Registration Department Statements stating that two of his mother’s elder siblings were born in Malaysia. This fact establishes the fact that his family was in Malaya since at least 1944, the date of birth of his second uncle.
  • A DNA test that establishes that
    • Mdm P is the elder sister of his mother, B
    • V is the biological son of B
  • The fact that in his mother’s Birth Certificate, her citizenship is recorded as “Belum Ditentukan” or “undetermined as yet”. This clearly demonstrates that the Registration Department is not alleging that she is a citizen of any other country.   
  • Statutory declarations from his aunt P, and the cousin who helped him register his (V’s) birth in 2011, when V was 24 years old. Both these declarations attest to the main facts of his history as recited above. 

Given all of these, V has provided strong evidence that he 

  • Was born in Malaysia
  • Was born after Malaysia Day
  • And that he does not have lineage that could lead to citizenship in any other country, as his mother was not the citizen of any other country at the time of his birth (and thereafter too.)

Sad to say, Judges in the Appeal Court also tripped up on the Jus Sanguinis principle and end up making the fatal flaw of thinking its application in a 1(e) case should mirror its application in a 1(a) case. As explained above, under 1(a) the applicant has to show his mother is a Malaysian citizen. Under 1(e) the applicant has to show that his mother had no claims to citizenship in any other country at the time of his birth, and I submit that he has done so quite thoroughly.

At both High Court and Appeal Court levels, the Judges surmised correctly that the Jus Sanguinis principle has a bearing in the evaluation of an 1(e) application’s merits. But they failed to realize that in 1(e), this principle of jus sanguinis involves proving that his mother is not a citizen of any other country. Instead, they asked the wrong question – whether his mother was a Malaysian citizen at the time for V’s birth. And she wasn’t. If she were, Velmurugan could have applied under 1(a), Part II Second Schedule. Why go through 1(e) at all? 

This may sound a bit arrogant, but here it is – four learned judges failed to realize that the principle of jus sanguinis when applied to 1(e) does not require the applicant to prove that his mother was a Malaysian citizen at the time of his birth. But this is the precisely the argument they used to reject his application. Hence the title of this article. 

And sadly, Mr V remains in limbo, struggling to provide for his 5 children, one of whom has a brain tumor. At the time of writing, he is in police lock-up in Slim River as he was unable to produce an IC or passport. Delays in resolving V’s citizenship issue is causing real pain and deprivation to this unfortunate family. What would you advise him/us to do?    

Jeyakumar Devaraj

Chairperson

Parti Sosialis Malaysia

17th November 2026